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Abstract. This paper addresses the problem of fair equilibrium selec-
tion in graphical games. Our approach is based on the data structure
called the best response policy, which was proposed by Kearns et al. [12]
as a way to represent all Nash equilibria of a graphical game. In [9], it
was shown that the best response policy has polynomial size as long as
the underlying graph is a path. In this paper, we show that if the under-
lying graph is a bounded-degree tree and the best response policy has
polynomial size then there is an efficient algorithm which constructs a
Nash equilibrium that guarantees certain payoffs to all participants. An-
other attractive solution concept is a Nash equilibrium that maximizes
the social welfare. We show that, while exactly computing the latter
is infeasible (we prove that solving this problem may involve algebraic
numbers of an arbitrarily high degree), there exists an FPTAS for finding
such an equilibrium as long as the best response policy has polynomial
size. These two algorithms can be combined to produce Nash equilibria
that satisfy various fairness criteria.
1 Introduction
In a large community of agents, an agent’s behavior is not likely to have a direct
effect on most other agents: rather, it is just the agents who are close enough to
him that will be affected. However, as these agents respond by adapting their
behavior, more agents will feel the consequences and eventually the choices made
by a single agent will propagate throughout the entire community.
This is the intuition behind graphical games, which were introduced by Kearns,
Littman and Singh in [12] as a compact representation scheme for games with
many players. In an n-player graphical game, each player is associated with a
vertex of an underlying graph G, and the payoffs of each player depend on his
action as well as on the actions of his neighbors in the graph. If the maximum
degree of G is ∆, and each player has two actions available to him, then the
game can be represented using n2∆+1 numbers. In contrast, we need n2n num-
bers to represent a general n-player 2-action game, which is only practical for
⋆ Supported by the EPSRC research grants “Algorithmics of Network-sharing Games”
and “Discontinuous Behaviour in the Complexity of randomized Algorithms”.
small values of n. For graphical games with constant ∆, the size of the game is
linear in n.
One of the most natural problems for a graphical game is that of finding a
Nash equilibrium, the existence of which follows from Nash’s celebrated theorem
(as graphical games are just a special case of n-player games). The first attempt
to tackle this problem was made in [12], where the authors consider graphical
games with two actions per player in which the underlying graph is a bounded-
degree tree. They propose a generic algorithm for finding Nash equilibria that
can be specialized in two ways: an exponential-time algorithm for finding an
(exact) Nash equilibrium, and a w fully polynomial time approximation scheme
(FPTAS) for finding an approximation to a Nash equilibrium. For any ǫ > 0 this
algorithm outputs an ǫ-Nash equilibrium, which is a strategy profile in which
no player can improve his payoff by more than ǫ by unilaterally changing his
strategy.
While ǫ-Nash equilibria are often easier to compute than exact Nash equi-
libria, this solution concept has several drawbacks. First, the players may be
sensitive to a small loss in payoffs, so the strategy profile that is an ǫ-Nash equi-
librium will not be stable. This will be the case even if there is only a small subset
of players who are extremely price-sensitive, and for a large population of play-
ers it may be difficult to choose a value of ǫ that will satisfy everyone. Second,
the strategy profiles that are close to being Nash equilibria may be much better
with respect to the properties under consideration than exact Nash equilibria.
Therefore, the (approximation to the) value of the best solution that corresponds
to an ǫ-Nash equilibrium may not be indicative of what can be achieved under
an exact Nash equilibrium. This is especially important if the purpose of the
approximate solution is to provide a good benchmark for a system of selfish
agents, as the benchmark implied by an ǫ-Nash equilibrium may be unrealistic.
For these reasons, in this paper we focus on the problem of computing exact
Nash equilibria.
Building on ideas of [13], Elkind et al. [9] showed how to find an (exact) Nash
equilibrium in polynomial time when the underlying graph has degree 2 (that is,
when the graph is a collection of paths and cycles). By contrast, finding a Nash
equilibrium in a general degree-bounded graph appears to be computationally
intractable: it has been shown (see [5, 11, 7]) to be complete for the complexity
class PPAD. [9] extends this hardness result to the case in which the underlying
graph has bounded pathwidth.
A graphical game may not have a unique Nash equilibrium, indeed it may
have exponentially many. Moreover, some Nash equilibria are more desirable
than others. Rather than having an algorithm which merely finds some Nash
equilibrium, we would like to have algorithms for finding Nash equilibria with
various socially-desirable properties, such as maximizing overall payoff or dis-
tributing profit fairly.
A useful property of the data structure of [12] is that it simultaneously repre-
sents the set of all Nash equilibria of the underlying game. If this representation
has polynomial size (as is the case for paths, as shown in [9]), one may hope to
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extract from it a Nash equilibrium with the desired properties. In fact, in [12]
the authors mention that this is indeed possible if one is interested in finding
an (approximate) ǫ-Nash equilibrium. The goal of this paper is to extend this to
exact Nash equilibria.
1.1 Our Results
In this paper, we study n-player 2-action graphical games on bounded-degree
trees for which the data structure of [12] has size poly(n). We focus on the prob-
lem of finding exact Nash equilibria with certain socially-desirable properties. In
particular, we show how to find a Nash equilibrium that (nearly) maximizes the
social welfare, i.e., the sum of the players’ payoffs, and we show how to find a
Nash equilibrium that (nearly) satisfies prescribed payoff bounds for all players.
Graphical games on bounded-degree trees have a simple algebraic structure.
One attractive feature, which follows from [12], is that every such game has a
Nash equilibrium in which the strategy of every player is a rational number.
Section 3 studies the algebraic structure of those Nash equilibria that maximize
social welfare. We show (Theorems 1 and 2) that, surprisingly, the set of Nash
equilibria that maximize social welfare is more complex. In fact, for any algebraic
number α ∈ [0, 1] with degree at most n, we exhibit a graphical game on a path of
length O(n) such that, in the unique social welfare-maximizing Nash equilibrium
of this game, one of the players plays the mixed strategy α.1 This result shows
that it may be difficult to represent an optimal Nash equilibrium. It seems to be
a novel feature of the setting we consider here, that an optimal Nash equilibrium
is hard to represent, in a situation where it is easy to find and represent a Nash
equilibrium.
As the social welfare-maximizing Nash equilibrium may be hard to represent
efficiently, we have to settle for an approximation. However, the crucial difference
between our approach and that of previous papers [12, 15, 18] is that we require
our algorithm to output an exact Nash equilibrium, though not necessarily the
optimal one with respect to our criteria. In Section 4, we describe an algorithm
that satisfies this requirement. Namely, we propose an algorithm that for any
ǫ > 0 finds a Nash equilibrium whose total payoff is within ǫ of optimal. It
runs in polynomial time (Theorem 3,4) for any graphical game on a bounded-
degree tree for which the data structure proposed by [12] (the so-called best
response policy, defined below) is of size poly(n) (note that, as shown in [9],
this is always the case when the underlying graph is a path). More precisely,
the running time of our algorithm is polynomial in n, Pmax, and 1/ǫ, where
Pmax is the maximum absolute value of an entry of a payoff matrix, i.e., it is
a pseudopolynomial algorithm, though it is fully polynomial with respect to
ǫ. We show (Section 4.1) that under some restrictions on the payoff matrices,
the algorithm can be transformed into a (truly) polynomial-time algorithm that
1 A related result in a different context was obtained by Datta [8], who shows that
n-player 2-action games are universal in the sense that any real algebraic variety can
be represented as the set of totally mixed Nash equilibria of such games.
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outputs a Nash equilibrium whose total payoff is within a 1− ǫ factor from the
optimal.
In Section 5, we consider the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in which
the expected payoff of each player Vi exceeds a prescribed threshold Ti. Using the
idea from Section 4 we give (Theorem 5) a fully polynomial time approximation
scheme for this problem. The running time of the algorithm is bounded by a
polynomial in n, Pmax, and ǫ. If the instance has a Nash equilibrium satisfying
the prescribed thresholds then the algorithm constructs a Nash equilibrium in
which the expected payoff of each player Vi is at least Ti − ǫ.
In Section 6, we introduce other natural criteria for selecting a “good” Nash
equilibrium and we show that the algorithms described in the two previous sec-
tions can be used as building blocks in finding Nash equilibria that satisfy these
criteria. In particular, in Section 6.1 we show how to find a Nash equilibrium
that approximates the maximum social welfare, while guaranteeing that each
individual payoff is close to a prescribed threshold. In Section 6.2 we show how
to find a Nash equilibrium that (nearly) maximizes the minimum individual pay-
off. Finally, in Section 6.3 we show how to find a Nash equilibrium in which the
individual payoffs of the players are close to each other.
1.2 Related Work
Our approximation scheme (Theorem 3 and Theorem 4) shows a contrast be-
tween the games that we study and two-player n-action games, for which the
corresponding problems are usually intractable. For two-player n-action games,
the problem of finding Nash equilibria with special properties is typically NP-
hard. In particular, this is the case for Nash equilibria that maximize the social
welfare [10, 6]. Moreover, it is likely to be intractable even to approximate such
equilibria. In particular, Chen, Deng and Teng [4] show that there exists some ǫ,
inverse polynomial in n, for which computing an ǫ-Nash equilibrium in 2-player
games with n actions per player is PPAD-complete.
Lipton and Markakis [14] study the algebraic properties of Nash equilibria,
and point out that standard quantifier elimination algorithms can be used to
solve them. Note that these algorithms are not polynomial-time in general. The
games we study in this paper have polynomial-time computable Nash equilib-
ria in which all mixed strategies are rational numbers, but an optimal Nash
equilibrium may necessarily include mixed strategies with high algebraic degree.
A correlated equilibrium (CE) (introduced by Aumann [2]) is a distribution
over vectors of players’ actions with the property that if any player is told his
own action (the value of his own component) from a vector generated by that
distribution, then he cannot increase his expected payoff by changing his action.
Any Nash equilibrium is a CE but the converse does not hold in general. In
contrast with Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria can be found for low-degree
graphical games (as well as other classes of concisely-represented multiplayer
games) in polynomial time [16]. But, for graphical games it is NP-hard to find
a correlated equilibrium that maximizes total payoff [17]. However, the NP-
hardness results apply to more general games than the one we consider here, in
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particular the graphs are not trees. From [2] it is also known that there exist 2-
player, 2-action games for which the expected total payoff of the best correlated
equilibrium is higher than the best Nash equilibrium, and we discuss this issue
further in Section 7.
2 Preliminaries and Notation
We consider graphical games in which the underlying graph G is an n-vertex
tree, in which each vertex has at most ∆ children. Each vertex has two actions,
which are denoted by 0 and 1. A mixed strategy of a player V is represented as
a single number v ∈ [0, 1], which denotes the probability that V selects action 1.
For the purposes of the algorithm, the tree is rooted arbitrarily. For conve-
nience, we assume without loss of generality that the root has a single child,
and that its payoff is independent of the action chosen by the child. This can
be achieved by first choosing an arbitrary root of the tree, and then adding a
dummy “parent” of this root, giving the new parent a constant payoff function,
e.g., 0.
Given an edge (V,W ) of the tree G, and a mixed strategy w for W , let
G(V,W ),W=w be the instance obtained from G by (1) deleting all nodes Z which
are separated from V by W (i.e., all nodes Z such that the path from Z to V
passes through W ), and (2) restricting the instance so that W is required to
play mixed strategy w.
Definition 1. Suppose that (V,W ) is an edge of the tree, that v is a mixed
strategy for V and that w is a mixed strategy for W . We say that v is a poten-
tial best response to w (denoted by v ∈ pbrV (w)) if there is an equilibrium in
the instance G(V,W ),W=w in which V has mixed strategy v. We define the best
response policy for V , given W , as B(W,V ) = {(w, v) | v ∈ pbrV (w), w ∈ [0, 1]}.
The upstream pass of the generic algorithm of [12] considers every node V
(other than the root) and computes the best response policy for V given its
parent. With the above assumptions about the root, the downstream pass is
straightforward. The root selects a mixed strategy w for the root W and a
mixed strategy v ∈ B(W,V ) for each child V of W . It instructs each child V
to play v. The remainder of the downward pass is recursive. When a node V is
instructed by its parent to adopt mixed strategy v, it does the following for each
child U — It finds a pair (v, u) ∈ B(V, U) (with the same v value that it was
given by its parent) and instructs U to play u.
The best response policy for a vertex U given its parent V can be represented
as a union of rectangles, where a rectangle is defined by a pair of closed intervals
(IV , IU ) and consists of all points in IV × IU ; it may be the case that one or
both of the intervals IV and IU consists of a single point. In order to perform
computations on B(V, U), and to bound the number of rectangles, [9] used the
notion of an event point, which is defined as follows. For any set A ⊆ [0, 1]2
that is represented as a union of a finite number of rectangles, we say that a
point u ∈ [0, 1] on the U -axis is a U -event point of A if u = 0 or u = 1 or the
5
representation of A contains a rectangle of the form IV ×IU and u is an endpoint
of IU ; V -event points are defined similarly.
For many games considered in this paper, the underlying graph is an n-vertex
path, i.e., a graph G = (V,E) with the vertex set V = {V1, . . . , Vn} and the edge
set E = {(V1, V2), . . . , (Vn−1, Vn)}. In [9], it was shown that for such games, the
best response policy has only polynomially-many rectangles. The proof that the
number of rectangles in B(Vj+1, Vj) is polynomial proceeds by first showing that
the number of event points in B(Vj+1, Vj) cannot exceed the number of event
points in B(Vj, Vj−1) by more than 2, and using this fact to bound the number
of rectangles in B(Vj+1, Vj).
Let P 0(V ) and P 1(V ) be the expected payoffs to V when it plays 0 and 1,
respectively. Both P 0(V ) and P 1(V ) are multilinear functions of the strategies
of V ’s neighbors. In what follows, we will frequently use the following simple
observation.
Claim. For a vertex V with a single child U and parentW , given anyA,B,C,D ∈
Q, A′, B′, C′, D′ ∈ Q, one can select the payoffs to V so that P 0(V ) = Auw +
Bu + Cw +D, P 1(V ) = A′uw +B′u + C′w +D′. Moreover, if all A, B, C, D,
A′, B′, C′, D′ are integer, the payoffs to V are integer as well.
Proof. We will give the proof for P 0(V ); the proof for P 1(V ) is similar. For
i, j = 0, 1, let Pij be the payoff to V when U plays i, V plays 0 and W plays j.
We have P 0(V ) = P00(1−u)(1−w)+P10u(1−w)+P01(1−u)w+P11uw. We have
to select the values of Pij so that P00 − P10 − P01 + P11 = A, −P00 + P10 = B,
−P00 + P01 = C, P00 = D. It is easy to see that the unique solution is given by
P00 = D, P01 = C +D, P10 = B +D, P11 = A+B + C +D.
The input to all algorithms considered in this paper includes the payoff matri-
ces for each player. We assume that all elements of these matrices are integer. Let
Pmax be the greatest absolute value of any element of any payoff matrix. Then
the input consists of at most n2∆+1 numbers, each of which can be represented
using ⌈logPmax⌉ bits.
3 Nash Equilibria That Maximize The Social Welfare:
Solutions in R \ Q
From the point of view of social welfare, the best Nash equilibrium is the one
that maximizes the sum of the players’ expected payoffs. Unfortunately, it turns
out that computing such a strategy profile exactly is not possible: in this section,
we show that even if all players’ payoffs are integers, the strategy profile that
maximizes the total payoff may have irrational coordinates; moreover, it may
involve algebraic numbers of an arbitrary degree.
3.1 Warm-up: quadratic irrationalities
We start by providing an example of a graphical game on a path of length 3
with integer payoffs such that in the Nash equilibrium that maximizes the total
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payoff, one of the players has a strategy in R \ Q. In the next subsection, we
will extend this example to algebraic numbers of arbitrary degree n; to do so,
we have to consider paths of length O(n).
Theorem 1. There exists an integer-payoff graphical game G on a 3-vertex path
UVW such that, in any Nash equilibrium of G that maximizes social welfare,
the strategy, u, of the player U and the total payoff, p, satisfy u, p ∈ R \Q.
Proof. The payoffs to the players in G are specified as follows. The payoff to U
is identically 0, i.e., P 0(U) = P 1(U) = 0. Using Claim 2, we select the payoffs to
V so that P 0(V ) = −uw+ 3w and P 1(V ) = P 0(V ) +w(u+ 2)− (u+ 1), where
u and w are the (mixed) strategies of U and W , respectively. It follows that V
is indifferent between playing 0 and 1 if and only if w = f(u) = u+1
u+2 . Observe
that for any u ∈ [0, 1] we have f(u) ∈ [0, 1]. The payoff to W is 0 if it selects the
same action as V and 1 otherwise.
Claim. All Nash equilibria of the game G are of the form (u, 1/2, f(u)). That
is, in any Nash equilibrium, V plays v = 1/2 and W plays w = f(u). Moreover,
for any value of u, the vector of strategies (u, 1/2, f(u)) constitutes a Nash
equilibrium.
Proof. It is easy to check that for any u ∈ [0, 1], the vector (u, 1/2, f(u)) is a
Nash equilibrium. Indeed, U is content to play any mixed strategy u no matter
what V and W do. Furthermore, V is indifferent between 0 and 1 as long as
w = f(u), so it can play 1/2. Finally, if V plays 0 and 1 with equal probability,
W is indifferent between 0 and 1, so it can play f(u).
Conversely, suppose that v > 1/2. Then W strictly prefers to play 0, i.e.,
w = 0. Then for V we have P 1(V ) = P 0(V ) − (u + 1), i.e., P 1(V ) < P 0(V ),
which implies v = 0, a contradiction. Similarly, if v < 1/2, player W prefers
to play 1, so we have w = 1. Hence, P 1(V ) = P 0(V ) + (u + 2) − (u + 1), i.e.,
P 1(V ) > P 0(V ), which implies v = 1, a contradiction. Finally, if v = 1/2, but
w 6= f(u), player V is not indifferent between 0 and 1, so he would deviate from
playing 1/2. This completes the proof of Claim 3.1.
By Claim 3.1, the total payoff in any Nash equilibrium of this game is a
function of u. More specifically, the payoff to U is 0, the payoff to V is −uf(u)+
3f(u), and the payoff to W is 1/2. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium with the
maximum total payoff corresponds to the value of u that maximizes
g(u) = −u (u+ 1)
u+ 2
+ 3
u+ 1
u+ 2
= − (u− 3)(u+ 1)
u+ 2
.
To find extrema of g(u), we compute h(u) = − d
du
g(u). We have
h(u) =
(2u− 2)(u + 2)− (u− 3)(u+ 1)
(u+ 2)2
=
u2 + 4u− 1
(u+ 2)2
.
Hence, h(u) = 0 if and only if u ∈ {−2+√5,−2−√5}. Note that −2+√5 ∈ [0, 1].
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The function g(u) changes sign at −2, −1, and 3. We have g(u) < 0 for
g > 3, g(u) > 0 for u < −2, so the extremum of g(u) that lies between 1 and
3, i.e., u = −2 +√5, is a local maximum. We conclude that the social welfare-
maximizing Nash equilibrium for this game is given by the vector of strategies
(−2 +√5, 1/2, (5−√5)/5). The respective total payoff is
0− (
√
5− 5)(√5− 1)√
5
+
1
2
= 13/2− 2
√
5.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
3.2 Strategies of arbitrary degree
We have shown that in the social welfare-maximizing Nash equilibrium, some
players’ strategies can be quadratic irrationalities, and so can the total payoff.
In this subsection, we will extend this result to show that we can construct an
integer-payoff graphical game on a path whose social welfare-maximizing Nash
equilibrium involves arbitrary algebraic numbers in [0, 1].
Theorem 2. For any degree-n algebraic number α ∈ [0, 1], there exists an in-
teger payoff graphical game on a path of length O(n) such that, in all social
welfare-maximizing Nash equilibria of this game, one of the players plays α.
Proof. Our proof consists of two steps. First, we construct a rational expression
R(x) and a segment [x′, x′′] such that x′, x′′ ∈ Q and α is the only maximum of
R(x) on [x′, x′′]. Second, we construct a graphical game whose Nash equilibria
can be parameterized by u ∈ [x′, x′′], so that at the equilibrium that corresponds
to u the total payoff is R(u) and, moreover, some player’s strategy is u. It follows
that to achieve the payoff-maximizing Nash equilibrium, this player has to play
α. The details follow.
Lemma 1. Given an algebraic number α ∈ [0, 1], deg(α) = n, there exist
K2, . . . ,K2n+2 ∈ Q and x′, x′′ ∈ (0, 1) ∩ Q such that α is the only maximum
of
R(x) =
K2
x+ 2
+ · · ·+ K2n+2
x+ 2n+ 2
on [x′, x′′].
Proof. Let P (x) be the minimal polynomial of α, i.e., a polynomial of degree
n with rational coefficients whose leading coefficient is 1 such that P (α) = 0.
Let A = {α1, . . . , αn} be the set of all roots of P (x). Consider the polynomial
Q1(x) = −P 2(x). It has the same roots as P (x), and moreover, for any x 6∈ A
we have Q1(x) < 0. Hence, A is the set of all maxima of Q1(x). Now, set
R(x) = Q1(x)(x+2)...(x+2n+1)(x+2n+2) . Observe that R(x) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1] and
R(x) = 0 if and only if Q1(x) = 0. Hence, the set A is also the set of all maxima
of R(x) on [0, 1].
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Let d = min{|αi − α| | αi ∈ A,αi 6= α}, and set α′ = max{α − d/2, 0},
α′′ = min{α+d/2, 1}. Clearly, α is the only zero (and hence, the only maximum)
of R(x) on [α′, α′′]. Let x′ and x′′ be some rational numbers in (α′, α) and (α, α′′),
respectively; note that by excluding the endpoints of the intervals we ensure that
x′, x′′ 6= 0, 1. As [x′, x′′] ⊂ [α′, α′′], we have that α is the only maximum of R(x)
on [x′, x′′].
As R(x) is a proper rational expression and all roots of its denominator are
simple, by partial fraction decomposition theorem, R(x) can be represented as
R(x) =
K2
x+ 2
+ · · ·+ K2n+2
x+ 2n+ 2
,
where K2, . . . ,K2n+2 are rational numbers.
Consider a graphical game on the path
U−1V−1U0V0U1V1 . . . Uk−1Vk−1Uk,
where k = 2n + 2. Intuitively, we want each triple (Ui−1, Vi−1, Ui) to behave
similarly to the players U , V , and W from the game described in the previous
subsection. More precisely, we define the payoffs to the players in the following
way.
– The payoff to U−1 is 0 no matter what everyone else does.
– The expected payoff to V−1 is 0 if it plays 0 and u0 − (x′′ − x′)u−1 − x′ if it
plays 1, where u0 and u−1 are the strategies of U0 and U−1, respectively.
– The expected payoff to V0 is 0 if it plays 0 and u1(u0 + 1)− u0 if it plays 1,
where u0 and u1 are the strategies of U0 and U1, respectively.
– For each i = 1, . . . , k − 1, the expected payoff to Vi when it plays 0 is
P 0(Vi) = Aiuiui+1 − Aiui+1, and the expected payoff to Vi when it plays 1
is P 1(Vi) = P
0(Vi) + ui+1(2 − ui) − 1, where Ai = −Ki+1 and ui+1 and ui
are the strategies of Ui+1 and Ui, respectively.
– For each i = 0, . . . , k, the payoff to Ui does not depend on Vi and is 1 if Ui
and Vi−1 select different actions and 0 otherwise.
We will now characterize the Nash equilibria of this game using a sequence of
claims.
Claim. In all Nash equilibria of this game V−1 plays 1/2, and the strategies of
u−1 and u0 satisfy u0 = (x
′′ − x′)u−1 + x′. Consequently, in all Nash equilibria
we have u0 ∈ [x′, x′′].
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Claim 3.1. Let f(u−1) = (x
′′−x′)u−1+x′.
Clearly, the player V−1 is indifferent between playing 0 and 1 if and only if
u0 = f(u−1). Suppose that v−1 < 1/2. Then U0 strictly prefers to play 1, i.e.,
u0 = 1, so we have
P 1(V−1) = P
0(V−1) + 1− (x′′ − x′)u−1 − x′.
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As
1− x′′ ≤ 1− (x′′ − x′)u−1 − x′ ≤ 1− x′
for u−1 ∈ [0, 1] and x′′ < 1, we have P 1(V−1) > P 0(V−1), so V−1 prefers to play
1, a contradiction. Similarly, if v−1 > 1/2, the player U0 strictly prefers to play
0, i.e., u0 = 0, so we have
P 1(V−1) = P
0(V−1)− (x′′ − x′)u−1 − x′.
As x′ < x′′, x′ > 0, we have P 1(V−1) < P
0(V−1), so V−1 prefers to play 0,
a contradiction. Finally, if V−1 plays 1/2, but u0 6= f(u−1), player V−1 is not
indifferent between 0 and 1, so he would deviate from playing 1/2.
Also, note that f(0) = x′, f(1) = x′′, and, moreover, f(u−1) ∈ [x′, x′′] if
and only if u−1 ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, in all Nash equilibria of this game we have
u0 ∈ [x′, x′′].
Claim. In all Nash equilibria of this game for each i = 0, . . . , k − 1, we have
vi = 1/2, and the strategies of the players Ui and Ui+1 satisfy ui+1 = fi(ui),
where f0(u) = u/(u+ 1) and fi(u) = 1/(2− u) for i > 0.
Proof. The proof of this claim is also similar to that of Claim 3.1. We use in-
duction on i to prove that the statement of the claim is true and, additionally,
ui 6= 1 for i > 0.
For the base case i = 0, note that u0 6= 0 by the previous claim (recall that
x′, x′′ are selected so that x′, x′′ 6= 0, 1) and consider the triple (U0, V0, U1).
Let v0 be the strategy of V0. First, suppose that v0 > 1/2. Then U1 strictly
prefers to play 0, i.e., u1 = 0. Then for V0 we have P
1(V0) = P
0(V0) − u0.
As u0 6= 0, we have P 1(V0) < P 0(V0), which implies v1 = 0, a contradiction.
Similarly, if v0 < 1/2, player U1 prefers to play 1, so we have u1 = 1. Hence,
P 1(V0) = P
0(V0) + 1. It follows that P
1(V0) > P
0(V0), which implies v0 = 1,
a contradiction. Finally, if v0 = 1/2, but u1 6= u0/(u0 + 1), player V0 is not
indifferent between 0 and 1, so he would deviate from playing 1/2. Moreover, as
u1 = u0/(u0 + 1) and u0 ∈ [0, 1], we have u1 6= 1.
The argument for the inductive step is similar. Namely, suppose that the
statement is proved for all i′ < i and consider the triple (Ui, Vi, Ui+1).
Let vi be the strategy of Vi. First, suppose that vi > 1/2. Then Ui+1 strictly
prefers to play 0, i.e., ui+1 = 0. Then for Vi we have P
1(Vi) = P
0(Vi) − 1, i.e.,
P 1(Vi) < P
0(Vi), which implies vi = 0, a contradiction. Similarly, if vi < 1/2,
player Ui+1 prefers to play 1, so we have ui+1 = 1. Hence, P
1(Vi) = P
0(Vi) +
1−ui. By inductive hypothesis, we have ui < 1. Consequently, P 1(Vi) > P 0(Vi),
which implies vi = 1, a contradiction. Finally, if vi = 1/2, but ui+1 6= 1/(2−ui),
player Vi is not indifferent between 0 and 1, so he would deviate from playing
1/2. Moreover, as ui+1 = 1/(2− ui) and ui < 1, we have ui+1 < 1.
Claim. Any strategy profile of the form
(u−1, 1/2, u0, 1/2, u1, 1/2, . . . , uk−1, 1/2, uk),
where u−1 ∈ [0, 1], u0 = (x′′−x′)u−1+x′, u1 = u0/(u0+1), and ui+1 = 1/(2−ui)
for i ≥ 1 constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
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Proof. First, the player U−1’s payoffs do not depend on other players’ actions,
so he is free to play any strategy in [0, 1]. As long as u0 = (x
′′ − x′)u−1 + x′,
player V−1 is indifferent between 0 and 1, so he is content to play 1/2; a similar
argument applies to players V0, . . . , Vk−1. Finally, for each i = 0, . . . , k, the
payoffs of player Ui only depend on the strategy of player Vi−1. In particular,
as long as vi−1 = 1/2, player Ui is indifferent between playing 0 and 1, so
he can play any mixed strategy ui ∈ [0, 1]. To complete the proof, note that
(x′′−x′)u−1+x′ ∈ [0, 1] for all u−1 ∈ [0, 1], u0/(u0+1) ∈ [0, 1] for all u0 ∈ [0, 1],
and 1/(2−ui) ∈ [0, 1] for all ui ∈ [0, 1], so we have ui ∈ [0, 1] for all i = 0, . . . , k.
Now, let us compute the total payoff under a strategy profile of the form
given in Claim 3.2. The payoff to U−1 is 0, and the expected payoff to each of
the Ui, i = 0, . . . , k, is 1/2. The expected payoffs to V−1 and V0 are 0. Finally,
for any i = 1, . . . , k − 1, the expected payoff to Vi is Ti = Aiuiui+1 − Aiui+1.
It follows that to find a Nash equilibrium with the highest total payoff, we have
to maximize
∑k−1
i=1 Ti subject to conditions u−1 ∈ [0, 1], u0 = (x′′ − x′)u−1 + x′,
u1 = u0/(u0 + 1), and ui+1 = 1/(2− ui) for i = 1, . . . , k − 1.
We would like to express
∑k−1
i=1 Ti as a function of u0. To simplify notation,
set u = u0.
Lemma 2. For i = 1, . . . , k, we have ui =
u+i−1
u+i .
Proof. The proof is by induction on i. For i = 1, we have u1 = u/(u+ 1). Now,
for i ≥ 2 suppose that ui−1 = (u+i−2)/(u+i−1). We have ui = 1/(2−ui−1) =
(u+ i− 1)/(2u+ 2i− 2− u− i+ 2) = (u+ i− 1)/(u+ i).
It follows that for i = 1, . . . , k − 1 we have
Ti = Ai
u+ i− 1
u+ i
u+ i
u+ i+ 1
−Ai u+ i
u+ i+ 1
=
−Ai 1
u+ i+ 1
=
Ki+1
u+ i+ 1
.
Observe that as u−1 varies from 0 to 1, u varies from x
′ to x′′. Therefore, to
maximize the total payoff, we have to choose u ∈ [x′, x′′] so as to maximize
K2
u+ 2
+ · · ·+ Kk
u+ k
= R(u).
By construction, the only maximum of R(u) on [x′, x′′] is α. It follows that in
the payoff-maximizing Nash equilibrium of our game U0 plays α.
Finally, note that the payoffs in our game are rational rather than integer.
However, it is easy to see that we can multiply all payoffs to a player by their
greatest common denominator without affecting his strategy. In the resulting
game, all payoffs are integer. This concludes the proof of Theorem 2.
4 Approximating The Socially Optimal Nash Equilibrium
We have seen that the Nash equilibrium that maximizes the social welfare may
involve strategies that are not in Q. Hence, in this section we focus on finding a
Nash equilibrium that is almost optimal from the social welfare perspective. We
propose an algorithm that for any ǫ > 0 finds a Nash equilibrium whose total
payoff is within ǫ from optimal. The running time of this algorithm is polynomial
in 1/ǫ, n and |Pmax| (recall that Pmax is the maximum absolute value of an entry
of a payoff matrix).
While the negative result of the previous section is for graphical games on
paths, our algorithm applies to a wider range of scenarios. Namely, it runs in
polynomial time on bounded-degree trees as long as the best response policy
of each vertex, given its parent, can be represented as a union of a polynomial
number of rectangles. Note that path graphs always satisfy this condition: in [9]
we showed how to compute such a representation, given a graph with maximum
degree 2. Consequently, for path graphs the running time of our algorithm is
guaranteed to be polynomial. (Note that [9] exhibits a family of graphical games
on bounded-degree trees for which the best response policies of some of the
vertices, given their parents, have exponential size, when represented as unions
of rectangles.)
Due to space restrictions, in this version of the paper we present the algorithm
for the case where the graph underlying the graphical game is a path. We then
state our result for the general case; the proof can be found in the appendix.
Suppose that s is a strategy profile for a graphical game G. That is, s assigns
a mixed strategy to each vertex of G. let EPV (s) be the expected payoff of
player V under s and let EP (s) =
∑
V EPV (s). Let
M(G) = max{EP (s) | s is a Nash equilibrium for G}.
Theorem 3. Suppose that G is a graphical game on an n-vertex path. Then for
any ǫ > 0 there is an algorithm that constructs a Nash equilibrium s′ for G that
satisfies EP (s′) ≥M(G)−ǫ. The running time of the algorithm is O(n4P 3max/ǫ3)
Proof. Let {V1, . . . , Vn} be the set of all players. We start by constructing the
best response policies for all Vi, i = 1, . . . , n − 1. As shown in [9], this can be
done in time O(n3).
Let N > 5n be a parameter to be selected later, set δ = 1/N , and define
X = {jδ | j = 0, . . . , N}. We say that vj is an event point for a player Vi if it
is a Vi-event point for B(Vi, Vi−1) or B(Vi+1, Vi). For each player Vi, consider a
finite set of strategies Xi given by
Xi = X ∪ {vj |vj is an event point for Vi}.
It has been shown in [9] that for any i = 2, . . . , n, the best response policy
B(Vi, Vi−1) has at most 2n + 4 Vi-event points. As we require N > 5n, we
have |Xi| ≤ 2N ; assume without loss of generality that |Xi| = 2N . Order the
elements of Xi in increasing order as x
1
i = 0 < x
2
i < · · · < x2Ni . We will refer
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to the strategies in Xi as discrete strategies of player Vi; a strategy profile in
which each player has a discrete strategy will be referred to as a discrete strategy
profile.
We will now show that even we restrict each player Vi to strategies from Xi,
the players can still achieve a Nash equilibrium, and moreover, the best such
Nash equilibrium (with respect to the social welfare) has total payoff at least
M(G)− ǫ as long as N is large enough.
Let s be a strategy profile that maximizes social welfare. That is, let s =
(s1, . . . , sn) where si is the mixed strategy of player Vi and EP (s) =M(G). For
i = 1, . . . , n, let ti = max{xji | xji ≤ si}. First, we will show that the strategy
profile t = (t1, . . . , tn) is a Nash equilibrium for G.
Fix any i, 1 < i ≤ n, and let R = [v1, v2]×[u1, u2] be the rectangle in
B(Vi, Vi−1) that contains (si, si−1). As v1 is a Vi-event point of B(Vi, Vi−1), we
have v1 ≤ ti, so the point (ti, si−1) is inside R. Similarly, the point u1 is a Vi−1-
event point of B(Vi, Vi−1), so we have u1 ≤ ti−1, and therefore the point (ti, ti−1)
is inside R. This means that for any i, 1 < i ≤ n, we have ti−1 ∈ pbrVi−1(ti),
which implies that t = (t1, . . . , tn) is a Nash equilibrium for G.
Now, let us estimate the expected loss in social welfare caused by playing t
instead of s.
Lemma 3. For any pair of strategy profiles t, s such that |ti − si| ≤ δ we have
|EPVi(s)− EPVi(t)| ≤ 24Pmaxδ for any i = 1, . . . , n.
Proof. Let P iklm be the payoff of the player Vi, when he plays k, Vi−1 plays l,
and Vi+1 plays m. Fix i = 1, . . . , n and for k, l,m ∈ {0, 1}, set
tklm = tki−1(1 − ti−1)1−ktli(1− ti)1−ltmi+1(1 − ti+1)1−m
sklm = ski−1(1 − si−1)1−ksli(1− si)1−lsmi+1(1− si+1)1−m.
We have
|EPVi(s)− EPVi(t)| ≤
∑
k,l,m=0,1
|P iklm(tklm − sklm)| ≤
8Pmaxmax
klm
|tklm − sklm|
We will now show that for any k, l,m ∈ {0, 1} we have |tklm−sklm| ≤ 3δ; clearly,
this implies the lemma.
Indeed, fix k, l,m ∈ {0, 1}. Set
x = tki−1(1− ti−1)1−k, x′ = ski−1(1 − si−1)1−k,
y = tli(1− ti)1−l, y′ = sli(1− si)1−l,
z = tmi+1(1− ti+1)1−m, z′ = smi+1(1− si+1)1−m.
Observe that if k = 0 then x − x′ = (1 − ti−1) − (1 − si−1), and if k = 1 then
x−x′ = ti−1−si−1, so |x−x′| ≤ δ. A similar argument shows |y−y′| ≤ δ, |z−z′| ≤
δ. Also, we have x, x′, y, y′, z, z′ ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, |tklm − sklm| = |xyz − x′y′z′| =
|xyz−x′yz+x′yz−x′y′z+x′y′z−x′y′z′| ≤ |x−x′|yz+|y−y′|x′z+|z−z′|x′y′ ≤ 3δ.
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Lemma 3 implies
∑n
i=1 |EPVi(s) − EPVi(t)| ≤ 24nPmaxδ, so by choosing
δ < ǫ/(24nPmax), or, equivalently, setting N > 24nPmax/ǫ, we can ensure that
the total expected payoff for the strategy profile t is within ǫ from optimal.
We will now show that we can find the best discrete Nash equilibrium (with
respect to the social welfare) using dynamic programming. As t is a discrete
strategy profile, this means that the strategy profile found by our algorithm will
be at least as good as t.
Define ml,ki to be the maximum total payoff that V1, . . . , Vi−1 can achieve if
each Vj , j ≤ i, chooses a strategy from Xj , for each j < i the strategy of Vj
is a potential best response to the strategy of Vj+1, and, moreover, Vi−1 plays
xli−1, Vi plays x
k
i . If there is no way to choose the strategies for V1, . . . , Vi−1
to satisfy these conditions, we set ml,ki = −∞. The values ml,ki , i = 1, . . . , n;
k, l = 1, . . . , N , can be computed inductively, as follows.
We have ml,k1 = 0 for k, l = 1, . . . , N . Now, suppose that we have already
computed ml,kj for all j < i; k, l = 1, . . . , N . To compute m
k,l
i , we first check if
(xki , x
l
i−1) ∈ B(Vi, Vi−1). If this is not the case, we have ml,ki = −∞. Otherwise,
consider the set Y = Xi−2 ∩ pbrVi−2(xli−1), i.e., the set of all discrete strategies
of Vi−2 that are potential best responses to x
l
i−1. The proof of Theorem 1 in [9]
implies that the set pbrVi−2(x
l
i−1) is non-empty: the player Vi−2 has a potential
best response to any strategy of Vi−1, in particular, x
l
i−1. By construction of
the set Xi−2, this implies that Y is not empty. For each x
j
i−2 ∈ Y , let pjlk
be the payoff that Vi−1 receives when Vi−2 plays x
j
i−2, Vi−1 plays x
l
i−1, and
Vi plays x
k
i . Clearly, pjlk can be computed in constant time. Then we have
ml,ki = max{mj,li−1 + pjlk | xji−2 ∈ Y }.
Finally, suppose that we have computed ml,kn for l, k = 1, . . . , N . We still
need to take into account the payoff of player Vn. Hence, we consider all pairs
(xkn, x
l
n−1) that satisfy x
l
n−1 ∈ pbrVn−1(xkn), and pick the one that maximizes the
sum of mk,ln and the payoff of Vn when he plays x
k
n and Vn−1 plays x
l
n−1. This
results in the maximum total payoff the players can achieve in a Nash equilibrium
using discrete strategies; the actual strategy profile that produces this payoff can
be reconstructed using standard dynamic programming techniques.
It is easy to see that eachml,ki can be computed in time O(N), i.e., all of them
can be computed in time O(nN3). Recall that we have to selectN ≥ (24nPmax)/ǫ
to ensure that the strategy profile we output has total payoff that is within ǫ
from optimal. We conclude that we can compute an ǫ-approximation to the best
Nash equilibrium in time O(n4P 3max/ǫ
3). This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
To state our result for the general case (i.e., when the underlying graph is
a bounded-degree tree rather than a path), we need additional notation. If G
has n players, let q(n) be an upper bound on the number of event points in
the representation of any best response policy. That is, we assume that for any
vertex U with parent V , B(V, U) has at most q(n) event points. We will be
interested in the situation in which q(n) is polynomial in n.
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Theorem 4. Let G be an n-player graphical game on a tree in which each node
has at most ∆ children. Suppose we are given a set of best-response policies
for G in which each best-response policy B(V, U) is represented by a set of rect-
angles with at most q(n) event points. For any ǫ > 0, there is an algorithm that
constructs a Nash equilibrium s′ for G that satisfies EP (s′) ≥ M(G) − ǫ. The
running time of the algorithm is polynomial in n, Pmax and ǫ
−1 provided that
the tree has bounded degree (that is, ∆ = O(1)) and q(n) is a polynomial in n.
In particular, if
N = max((∆ + 1)q(n) + 1, n2∆+2(∆+ 2)Pmaxǫ
−1)
and ∆ > 1 then the running time is O(n∆(2N)∆.
The proof of this theorem can be found in the appendix.
4.1 A polynomial-time algorithm for multiplicative approximation
The running time of our algorithm is pseudopolynomial rather than polynomial,
because it includes a factor which is polynomial in Pmax, the maximum (in
absolute value) entry in any payoff matrix. If we are interested in multiplicative
approximation rather than additive one, this can be improved to polynomial.
First, note that we cannot expect a multiplicative approximation for all in-
puts. That is, we cannot hope to have an algorithm that computes a Nash
equilibrium with total payoff at least (1− ǫ)M(G). If we had such an algorithm,
then for graphical games G with M(G) = 0, the algorithm would be required to
output the optimal solution. To show that this is infeasible, observe that we can
use the techniques of Section 3.2 to construct two integer-coefficient graphical
games on paths of length O(n) such that for some X ∈ R the maximal total
payoff in the first game is X , the maximal total payoff in the second game is
−X , and for both games, the strategy profiles that achieve the maximal total
payoffs involve algebraic numbers of degree n. By combining the two games so
that the first vertex of the second game becomes connected to the last vertex of
the first game, but the payoffs of all players do not change, we obtain a graphical
game in which the best Nash equilibrium has total payoff 0, yet the strategies
that lead to this payoff have high algebraic complexity.
However, we can achieve a multiplicative approximation when all entries
of the payoff matrices are positive and the ratio between any two entries is
polynomially bounded. Recall that we assume that all payoffs are integer, and
let Pmin > 0 be the smallest entry of any payoff matrix. In this case, for any
strategy profile the payoff to player i is at least Pmin, so the total payoff in the
social-welfare maximizing Nash equilibrium s satisfiesM(G) ≥ nPmin. Moreover,
Lemma 3 implies that by choosing δ < ǫ/(24Pmax/Pmin), we can ensure that the
Nash equilibrium t produced by our algorithm satisfies
n∑
i=1
EPVi(s)−
n∑
i=1
EPVi(t) ≤ 24Pmaxδn ≤ ǫnPmin ≤ ǫM(G),
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i.e., for this value of δ we have
∑n
i=1EPVi(t) ≥ (1 − ǫ)M(G). Recall that the
running time of our algorithm is O(nN3), where N has to be selected to satisfy
N > 5n, N = 1/δ. It follows that if Pmin > 0, Pmax/Pmin = poly(n), we
can choose N so that our algorithm provides a multiplicative approximation
guarantee and runs in time polynomial in n and 1/ǫ.
5 Bounded Payoff Nash Equilibria
Another natural way to define what is a “good” Nash equilibrium is to require
that each player’s expected payoff exceeds a certain threshold. These thresholds
do not have to be the same for all players. In this case, in addition to the payoff
matrices of the n players, we are given n numbers T1, . . . , Tn, and our goal is to
find a Nash equilibrium in which the payoff of player i is at least Ti, or report
that no such Nash equilibrium exists. It turns out that we can design an FPTAS
for this problem using the same techniques as in the previous section.
Theorem 5. Given a graphical game G on an n-vertex path and n rational
numbers T1, . . . , Tn, suppose that there exists a strategy profile s such that s is a
Nash equilibrium for G and EPVi(s) ≥ Ti for i = 1, . . . , n. Then for any ǫ > 0
we can find in time O(max{nP 3max/ǫ3, n4/ǫ3}) a strategy profile s′ such that s′
is a Nash equilibrium for G and EPVi(s
′) ≥ Ti − ǫ for i = 1, . . . , n.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 3. First, we construct the best
response policies for all players, choose N > 5n, and construct the sets Xi,
i = 1, . . . , n, as described in the proof of Theorem 3.
Consider a strategy profile s such that s is a Nash equilibrium for G and
EPVi(s) ≥ Ti for i = 1, . . . , n. We construct a strategy profile ti = max{xji | xji ≤
si} and use the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 3 to show that t is a
Nash equilibrium for G. By Lemma 3, we have |EPVi(s)−EPVi(t)| ≤ 24Pmaxδ,
so choosing δ < ǫ/(24Pmax), or, equivalently, N > max{5n, 24Pmax/ǫ}, we can
ensure EPVi(t) ≥ Ti − ǫ for i = 1, . . . , n.
Now, we will use dynamic programming to find a discrete Nash equilibrium
that satisfies EPVi(t) ≥ Ti − ǫ for i = 1, . . . , n. As t is a discrete strategy
profile, our algorithm will succeed whenever there is a strategy profile s with
EPVi(s) ≥ Ti − ǫ for i = 1, . . . , n.
Let zl,ki = 1 if there is a discrete strategy profile such that for any j < i the
strategy of the player Vj is a potential best response to the strategy of Vj+1, the
expected payoff of Vj is at least Tj − ǫ, and, moreover, Vi−1 plays xli−1, Vi plays
xki . Otherwise, let z
l,k
i = 0. We can compute z
l,k
i , i = 1, . . . , n; k, l = 1, . . . , N
inductively, as follows.
We have zl,k1 = 1 for k, l = 1, . . . , N . Now, suppose that we have already
computed zl,kj for all j < i; k, l = 1, . . . , N . To compute z
k,l
i , we first check
if (xki , x
l
i−1) ∈ B(Vi, Vi−1). If this is not the case, clearly, zk,li = 0. Otherwise,
consider the set Y = Xi−2 ∩ pbrVi−2(xli−1), i.e., the set of all discrete strategies
of Vi−2 that are potential best responses to x
l
i−1. It has been shown in the proof
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of Theorem 3 that Y 6= ∅. For each xji−2 ∈ Y , let pjlk be the payoff that Vi−1
receives when Vi−2 plays x
j
i−2, Vi−1 plays x
l
i−1, and Vi plays x
k
i . Clearly, pjlk can
be computed in constant time. If there exists an xji−2 ∈ Y such that zj,li−1 = 1
and pjlk ≥ Ti−2 − ǫ, set zl,ki = 1. Otherwise, set zl,ki = 0.
Having computed zl,kn , l, k = 1, . . . , N , we check if z
l,k
n = 1 for some pair
(l, k). if such a pair of indices exists, we instruct Vn to play x
k
n and use dynamic
programming techniques (or, equivalently, the downstream pass of the algorithm
of [12]) to find a Nash equilibrium s′ that satisfies EPVi(s
′) ≥ Ti − ǫ for i =
1, . . . , n (recall that Vn is a dummy player, i.e., we assume Tn = 0, EPn(s
′) = 0
for any choice of s′). If zl,kn = 0 for all l, k = 1, . . . , N , there is no discrete Nash
equilibrium s′ that satisfies EPVi(s
′) ≥ Ti− ǫ for i = 1, . . . , n and hence no Nash
equilibrium s (not necessarily discrete) such that EPVi(s) ≥ Ti for i = 1, . . . , n.
The running time analysis is similar to that for Theorem 3; we conclude that
the running time of our algorithm is O(nN3) = O(max{nP 3max/ǫ3, n4/ǫ3}).
Remark 1. Theorem 5 can be extended to trees of bounded degree in the same
way as Theorem 4.
5.1 Exact Computation
Another approach to finding Nash equilibria with bounded payoffs is based on
inductively computing the subsets of the best response policies of all players
so as to exclude the points that do not provide sufficient payoffs to some of
the players. Formally, we say that a strategy v of the player V is a potential
best response to a strategy w of its parent W with respect to a threshold vector
T = (T1, . . . , Tn), (denoted by v ∈ pbrV (w,T)) if there is an equilibrium in the
instance G(V,W ),W=w in which V plays mixed strategy v and the payoff to any
player Vi downstream of V (including V ) is at least Ti. The best response policy
for V with respect to a threshold vector T is defined as B(W,V,T) = {(w, v) |
v ∈ pbrV (w,T), w ∈ [0, 1]}.
It is easy to see that if any of the sets B(Vj , Vj−1,T), j = 1, . . . , n, is empty, it
means that it is impossible to provide all players with expected payoffs prescribed
by T. Otherwise, one can apply the downstream pass of the original algorithm
of [12] to find a Nash equilibrium. As we assume that Vn is a dummy vertex
whose payoff is identically 0, the Nash equilibrium with these payoffs exists as
long as Tn ≤ 0 and B(Vn, Vn−1,T) is not empty.
Using the techniques developed in [9], it is not hard to show that for any
j = 1, . . . , n, the set B(Vj , Vj−1,T) consists of a finite number of rectangles, and
moreover, one can compute B(Vj+1, Vj ,T) given B(Vj, Vj−1,T). The advantage
of this approach is that it allows us to represent all Nash equilibria that provide
required payoffs to the players. However, it is not likely to be practical, since it
turns out that the rectangles that appear in the representation of B(Vj , Vj−1,T)
may have irrational coordinates.
Claim. There exists a graphical game G on a 3-vertex path UVW and a vector
T = (T1, T2, T3) such that B(V,W,T) cannot be represented as a union of a
finite number of rectangles with rational coordinates.
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Proof. We define the payoffs to the players in G as follows. The payoff to U is
identically 0, i.e., P 0(U) = P 1(U) = 0. Using Claim 2, we select the payoffs to
V so that P 0(V ) = uw, P 1(V ) = P 0(V ) + w − .8u − .1, where u and w are
the (mixed) strategies of U and W , respectively. It follows that V is indifferent
between playing 0 and 1 if and only if w = f(u) = .8u+ .1; observe that for any
u ∈ [0, 1] we have f(u) ∈ [0, 1]. It is not hard to see that we have
B(W,V ) = [0, .1]×{0} ∪ [.1, .9]×[0, 1] ∪ [.9, 1]×{1}.
The payoffs to W are not important for our construction; for example, set
P0(W ) = P0(W ) = 0.
Now, set T = (0, 1/8, 0), i.e., we are interested in Nash equilibria in which V ’s
expected payoff is at least 1/8. Suppose w ∈ [0, 1]. The player V can play a mixed
strategy v when W is playing w as long as U plays u = f−1(w) = 5w/4 − 1/8
(to ensure that V is indifferent between 0 and 1) and P 0(V ) = P 1(V ) = uw =
w(5w/4 − 1/8) ≥ 1/8. The latter condition is satisfied if w ≤ (1 −√41)/20 < 0
or w ≥ (1 +√41)/20. Note that we have .1 < (1 +√41)/20 < .9. For any other
value of w, any strategy of U either makes V prefer one of the pure strategies
or does not provide it with a sufficient expected payoff. There are also some
values of w for which V can play a pure strategy (0 or 1) as a potential best
response to W and guarantee itself an expected payoff of at least 1/8; it can
be shown that these values of w form a finite number of segments in [0, 1]. We
conclude that any representation of B(W,V,T) as a union of a finite number of
rectangles must contain a rectangle of the form [(1 +
√
41)/20, w′′]×[v′, v′′] for
some w′′, v′, v′′ ∈ [0, 1].
On the other hand, it can be shown that for any integer payoff matrices and
threshold vectors and any j = 1, . . . , n − 1, the sets B(Vj+1, Vj ,T) contain no
rectangles of the form [u′, u′′]×{v} or {v}×[w′, w′′], where v ∈ R\Q. This means
that if B(Vn, Vn−1,T) is non-empty, i.e., there is a Nash equilibrium with payoffs
prescribed by T, then the downstream pass of the algorithm of [12] can always
pick a strategy profile that forms a Nash equilibrium, provides a payoff of at
least Ti to the player Vi, and has no irrational coordinates. Hence, unlike in the
case of the Nash equilibrium that maximizes the social welfare, working with
irrational numbers is not necessary, and the fact that the algorithm discussed in
this section has to do so can be seen as an argument against using this approach.
6 Other Criteria for Selecting a Nash Equilibrium
In this section, we consider several other criteria that can be useful in selecting
a Nash equilibrium.
6.1 Combining welfare maximization with
bounds on payoffs
In many real life scenarios, we want to maximize the social welfare subject to
certain restrictions on the payoffs to individual players. For example, we may
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want to ensure that no player gets a negative expected payoff, or that the ex-
pected payoff to player i is at least P imax− ξ, where P imax is the maximum entry
of i’s payoff matrix and ξ is a fixed parameter. Formally, given a graphical game
G and a vector T1, . . . , Tn, let S be the set of all Nash equilibria s of G that
satisfy Ti ≤ EPVi(s) for i = 1, . . . , n, and let sˆ = argmaxs∈S EP (s).
If the set S is non-empty, we can find a Nash equilibrium sˆ′ that is ǫ-close
to satisfying the payoff bounds and is within ǫ from sˆ with respect to the total
payoff by combining the algorithms of Section 4 and Section 5.
Namely, for a given ǫ > 0, choose δ as in the proof of Theorem 3, and let
Xi be the set of all discrete strategies of player Vi (for a formal definition, see
the proof of Theorem 3). Combining the proofs of Theorem 3 and Theorem 5,
we can see that the strategy profile tˆ given by tˆi = max{xji | xji ≤ sˆi} satisfies
EPVi(tˆ) ≥ Ti − ǫ, |EP (sˆ)− EP (tˆ)| ≤ ǫ.
Define mˆl,ki to be the maximum total payoff that V1, . . . , Vi−1 can achieve if
each Vj , j ≤ i, chooses a strategy from Xj , for each j < i the strategy of Vj
is a potential best response to the strategy of Vj+1 and the payoff to player Vj
is at least Tj − ǫ, and, moreover, Vi−1 plays xli−1, Vi plays xki . If there is no
way to choose the strategies for V1, . . . , Vi−1 to satisfy these conditions, we set
ml,ki = −∞. The mˆl,ki can be computed by dynamic programming similarly to
the ml,ki and z
l,k
i in the proofs of Theorems 3 and 5. Finally, as in the proof of
Theorem 3, we use ml,kn to select the best discrete Nash equilibrium subject to
the payoff constraints.
Even more generally, we may want to maximize the total payoff to a subset
of players (who are assumed to be able to redistribute the profits fairly among
themselves) while guaranteeing certain expected payoffs to (a subset of) the
other players. This problem can be handled similarly.
6.2 A minimax approach
A more egalitarian measure of the quality of a Nash equilibrium is the minimal
expected payoff to a player. The optimal solution with respect to this measure is a
Nash equilibrium in which the minimal expected payoff to a player is maximal. To
find an approximation to such a Nash equilibrium, we can combine the algorithm
of Section 5 with binary search on the space of potential lower bounds. Note
that the expected payoff to any player Vi given a strategy s always satisfies
−Pmax ≤ EPVi(s) ≤ Pmax.
For a fixed ǫ > 0, we start by setting T ′ = −Pmax, T ′′ = Pmax, T ∗ =
(T ′+T ′′)/2. We then run the algorithm of Section 5 with T1 = · · · = Tn = T ∗. If
the algorithm succeeds in finding a Nash equilibrium s′ that satisfies EPVi(s
′) ≥
T ∗ − ǫ for all i = 1, . . . , n, we set T ′ = T ∗, T ∗ = (T ′ + T ′′)/2; otherwise, we set
T ′′ = T ∗, T ∗ = (T ′+T ′′)/2 and loop. We repeat this process until |T ′−T ′′| ≤ ǫ.
It is not hard to check that for any p ∈ R, if there is a Nash equilibrium s such
that mini=1,...,nEPVi(s) ≥ p, then our algorithm outputs a Nash equilibrium s′
that satisfies mini=1,...,nEPVi(s) ≥ p− 2ǫ. The running time of our algorithm is
O(max{nP 3max log ǫ−1/ǫ3, n4 log ǫ−1/ǫ3}).
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6.3 Equalizing the payoffs
When the players’ payoff matrices are not very different, it is reasonable to
demand that the expected payoffs to the players do not differ by much either.
We will now show that Nash equilibria in this category can be approximated in
polynomial time as well.
Indeed, observe that the algorithm of Section 5 can be easily modified to
deal with upper bounds on individual payoffs rather than lower bounds. More-
over, we can efficiently compute an approximation to a Nash equilibrium that
satisfies both the upper bound and the lower bound for each player. More pre-
cisely, suppose that we are given a graphical game G, 2n rational numbers
T1, . . . , Tn, T
′
1, . . . , T
′
n and ǫ > 0. Then if there exists a strategy profile s such
that s is a Nash equilibrium for G and Ti ≤ EPVi(s) ≤ T ′i for i = 1, . . . , n, we can
find a strategy profile s′ such that s′ is a Nash equilibrium for G and Ti − ǫ ≤
EPVi(s
′) ≤ T ′i + ǫ for i = 1, . . . , n. The modified algorithm also runs in time
O(max{nP 3max/ǫ3, [4]n4/ǫ3}).
This observation allows us to approximate Nash equilibria in which all play-
ers’ expected payoffs differ by at most ξ for any fixed ξ > 0. Given an ǫ > 0,
we set T1 = · · · = Tn = −Pmax, T ′1 = · · · = T ′n = −Pmax + ξ + ǫ, and run
the modified version of the algorithm of Section 5. If it fails to find a solution,
we increment all Ti, T
′
i by ǫ and loop. We continue until the algorithm finds a
solution, or Ti ≥ Pmax.
Suppose that there exists a Nash equilibrium s that satisfies
|EPVi(s) − EPVj (s)| ≤ ξ for all i, j = 1, . . . , n. Set r = mini=1,...,nEPVi(s);
we have r ≤ EPVi(s) ≤ r + ξ for all i = 1, . . . , n. There exists a k ≥ 0 such
that −Pmax + (k − 1)ǫ ≤ r ≤ −Pmax + kǫ. During the kth step of the algo-
rithm, we set T1 = · · · = Tn = −Pmax + (k − 1)ǫ, i.e., we have r − ǫ ≤ Ti ≤ r,
r + ξ ≤ T ′i ≤ r + ξ + ǫ. That is, the Nash equilibrium s satisfies Ti ≤ r ≤
EPVi(s) ≤ r+ ξ ≤ T ′i , which means that when Ti is set to −Pmax+(k− 1)ǫ, our
algorithm is guaranteed to output a Nash equilibrium t that satisfies r − 2ǫ ≤
Ti− ǫ ≤ EPVi(t) ≤ T ′i + ǫ ≤ r+ ξ+2ǫ. We conclude that whenever such a Nash
equilibrium s exists, our algorithm outputs a Nash equilibrium t that satisfies
|EPVi(t) − EPVj (t)| ≤ ξ + 4ǫ for all i, j = 1, . . . , n. The running time of this
algorithm is O(max{nP 3max/ǫ4, n4/ǫ4}).
Note also that we can find the smallest ξ for which such a Nash equilib-
rium exists by combining this algorithm with binary search over the space
ξ = [0, 2Pmax]. This identifies an approximation to the “fairest” Nash equi-
librium, i.e., one in which the players’ expected payoffs differ by the smallest
possible amount.
Finally, note that all results in this section can be extended to bounded-
degree trees.
7 Conclusions
We have studied the problem of equilibrium selection in graphical games on
bounded-degree trees. We considered several criteria for selecting a Nash equi-
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librium, such as maximizing the social welfare, ensuring a lower bound on the
expected payoff of each player, etc. First, we focused on the algebraic complex-
ity of a social welfare-maximizing Nash equilibrium, and proved strong negative
results for that problem. Namely, we showed that even for graphical games on
paths, any algebraic number α ∈ [0, 1] may be the only strategy available to some
player in all social welfare-maximizing Nash equilibria. This is in sharp contrast
with the fact that graphical games on trees always possess a Nash equilibrium
in which all players’ strategies are rational numbers.
We then provided approximation algorithms for selecting Nash equilibria
with special properties. While the problem of finding approximate Nash equilib-
ria for various classes of games has received a lot of attention in recent years,
most of the existing work aims to find ǫ-Nash equilibria that satisfy (or are ǫ-
close to satisfying) certain properties. Our approach is different in that we insist
on outputting an exact Nash equilibrium, which is ǫ-close to satisfying a given
requirement. As argued in the introduction, there are several reasons to prefer
a solution that constitutes an exact Nash equilibrium.
Our algorithms are fully polynomial time approximation schemes, i.e., their
running time is polynomial in the inverse of the approximation parameter ǫ,
though they may be pseudopolynomial with respect to the input size. Under
mild restrictions on the inputs, they can be modified to be truly polynomial.
This is the strongest positive result one can derive for a problem whose exact
solutions may be hard to represent, as is the case for many of the problems
considered here. While we prove most of our results for games on a path, they
can be generalized to any tree for which the best response policies have compact
representations as unions of rectangles. In the appendix, we show how to do
this for the algorithm that finds a payoff-maximizing Nash equilibrium; other
algorithms can be treated similarly.
Further work in this vein could include extensions to the kinds of guarantees
sought for Nash equilibria, such as guaranteeing total payoffs for subsets of play-
ers, selecting equilibria in which some players are receiving significantly higher
payoffs than their peers, etc. At the moment however, it is perhaps more impor-
tant to investigate whether Nash equilibria of graphical games can be computed
in a decentralized manner, in contrast to the algorithms we have introduced
here.
It is natural to ask if our results or those of [9] can be generalized to games
with three or more actions. However, it seems that this will make the analysis
significantly more difficult. In particular, note that one can view the bounded
payoff games as a very limited special case of games with three actions per player.
Namely, given a two-action game with payoff bounds, consider a game in which
each player Vi has a third action that guarantees him a payoff of Ti no matter
what everyone else does. Then checking if there is a Nash equilibrium in which
none of the players assigns a non-zero probability to his third action is equivalent
to checking if there exists a Nash equilibrium that satisfies the payoff bounds in
the original game, and Section 5.1 shows that finding an exact solution to this
problem requires new ideas.
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Alternatively it may be interesting to look for similar results in the context
of correlated equilibria (CE), especially since the best CE may have higher value
(total expected payoff) than the best NE. The ratio between these values is
called the mediation value in [1]. It is known from [1] that the mediation value
of 2-player, 2-action games with non-negative payoffs is at most 43 , and they
exhibit a 3-player game for which it is infinite. Furthermore, a 2-player, 3-action
example from [1] also has infinite mediation value.
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8 Appendix
Theorem 4 Let G be an n-player graphical game on a tree in which each node
has at most ∆ children. Suppose we are given a set of best-response policies
for G in which each best-response policy B(V, U) is represented by a set of
rectangles with at most q(n) event points. For any ǫ > 0, there is an algorithm
that constructs a Nash equilibrium s′ for G that satisfies EP (s′) ≥ M(G) − ǫ.
The running time of the algorithm is polynomial in n, Pmax and ǫ
−1 provided
that the tree has bounded degree (that is, ∆ = O(1)) and q(n) is a polynomial
in n. In particular, if
N = max((∆ + 1)q(n) + 1, n2∆+2(∆+ 2)Pmaxǫ
−1)
and ∆ > 1 then the running time is O(n∆(2N)
∆
.
Proof. Let δ = 1/N and let X = {jδ | j = 0, . . . , N}. Consider the set of best-
response policies for G. We say that a point v ∈ [0, 1] is an event point for a
player V with parent W if either v is a V -event point of B(W,V ) or, for some
child U of V , v is a V -event point of B(V, U). Let X ′V be the set of event points
for V . Since N ≥ (∆+1)q(n) + 1, |X ′V | ≤ N − 1. Let XV be a size-2N superset
of X ∪X ′V .
We will refer to the strategies in XV as discrete strategies of player V . A
strategy profile in which each player has a discrete strategy will be referred to
as a discrete strategy profile. We will now show that there is a discrete strategy
profile t which is a Nash equilibrium and in which the total payoff is at least
M(G)− ǫ.
Let s be a Nash equilibrium that maximizes social welfare (so EP (s) =
M(G)). For every player V , let tV = max{xV ∈ XV | xV ≤ sV }.
First, we will show that the strategy profile t is a Nash equilibrium for G.
Consider a player V with parent W . Let R = [w1, w2]×[v1, v2] be the rectangle
in B(W,V ) that contains (sW , sV ). As w1 is a W -event point of B(W,V ), we
have w1 ≤ tW and tW ≤ sw ≤ w2, so the point (tW , sV ) is inside R. Similarly,
the point v1 is a V -event point of B(W,V ), so we have v1 ≤ tV , and therefore
the point (tW , tV ) is inside R. This means that for any player V with parent W ,
we have tV ∈ pbrV (tW ), which implies that t is a Nash equilibrium for G.
Now, let us estimate the expected loss in social welfare caused by playing t
instead of s.
Lemma 4. For any pair of strategy profiles t, s such that, for all players V ,
|tV − sV | ≤ δ, we also have
|EPV (s)− EPV (t)| ≤ 2∆+2(∆+ 2)Pmaxδ
for all V .
Proof. Fix any player U1. Let U0 be his parent, and let U2, . . . , Ud be his children.
For σ ∈ {0, 1}d+1, let Pσ be the payoff to U1 when, for ℓ ∈ {0, . . . , d + 1}, Uℓ
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plays σℓ. Let tσ be the probability that this event occurs according to strategy
profile t. Formally, let
Ψ(z, b) =
{ z, if b = 1,
1− z, if b = 0.
Then
tσ =
d+1∏
ℓ=0
Ψ(tUℓ , σℓ).
Similarly, let sσ be the probability that this event occurs according to strategy
profile s. Then
|EPV (s)− EPV (t)| =
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
σ
Pσtσ −
∑
σ
Pσsσ
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
σ
|Pσ(tσ − sσ)|
≤ 2∆+2Pmaxmax
σ
|tσ − sσ|.
We will now show that, for any σ, |tσ−sσ| ≤ (∆+2)δ, which implies the lemma.
For r ∈ {0, . . . , d+ 2}, let
zr,σ =
r−1∏
ℓ=0
Ψ(tUℓ , σℓ)
d+1∏
ℓ=r
Ψ(sUℓ , σℓ).
Since |tUℓ − sUℓ | ≤ δ, we have, for any j ∈ {0, 1}, |Ψ(tUℓ , j)− Ψ(sUℓ , j)| ≤ δ.
So |zℓ,σ − zℓ−1,σ| ≤ δ. Then
|tσ − sσ| = |zd+2,σ − z0,σ| =
∣∣∣∣∣
d+2∑
ℓ=1
(zℓ,σ − zℓ−1,σ)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
d+2∑
ℓ=1
|zℓ,σ − zℓ−1,σ| ≤ (∆+ 2)δ.
So by Lemma 4, the expected loss in social welfare caused by playing t
instead of s is at most n2∆+2(∆+2)Pmaxδ. Since N = 1/δ is at least n2
∆+2(∆+
2)Pmaxǫ
−1, this is at most ǫ.
We will now show that how to find the best discrete Nash equilibrium (with
respect to the social welfare) using dynamic programming. As t is a discrete
strategy profile, the strategy profile found by our algorithm will be at least as
good as t.
For a player V with d children and a string τ ∈ {1, . . . , 2N}d+1, define
mV,τ to be the maximum total payoff that proper descendants of V can achieve
in a strategy profile satisfying the following conditions, where xV denotes the
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τ0’th strategy from the discrete strategy set XV of player V , and for every
ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , d}, Uℓ is the ℓ’th child of V and xUℓ is the τℓ’th strategy from the
discrete strategy set XUℓ .
– V plays xV .
– For every ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , d}, Uℓ plays xUℓ .
– All descendants of V play strategies from their discrete strategy sets.
– For every proper descendant U of V , the strategy chosen by U is a potential
best response to the strategy chosen by its parent.
If no strategy profile satisfies these conditions, mV,τ = −∞.
For any leaf V of the tree and any string τ , mV,τ = 0. Here is how the
algorithm computes mV,τ for an internal vertex V , assuming it has already com-
puted mU,τ ′ for all proper descendants U of V and all strings τ
′. First, it checks
every child Uℓ of V , to see whether xUℓ ∈ pbrUℓ(xV ). If this is not the case,
the algorithm sets mV,τ = −∞ and finishes. Now let rℓ denote the number of
children of Uℓ (which may be zero) and let m̂ℓ equal
max
{
mUℓ,τ ′ + Pℓ,τ ′ | τ ′ ∈ {1, . . . , 2N}rℓ+1, τ ′0 = τℓ
}
,
where Pℓ,τ ′ denotes the payoff to Uℓ when V plays xV and Uℓ and its children
play according to τ ′ (the ith child of Uℓ plays the τ
′
ith element of its discrete
strategy set and Uℓ plays xUℓ). Then
mV,τ =
d∑
ℓ=1
m̂ℓ,
and this can be computed in polynomial time by considering each possible τ ′ (at
most (2N)
∆
of them) for each child Uℓ (of which there are at most ∆).
Finally, suppose that we have computed all of the values mV,τ . We assumed
without loss of generality (see Section 2) that the root of the tree is a node V
which has constant payoff 0, independently of the action chosen by its singleton
child U1. To find the discrete strategy that maximizes social welfare, we just
choose the τ ∈ {1, . . . , 2N}2 that maximises mV,τ . This value, mV,τ is the social
welfare achieved by the algorithm. The discrete strategy that achieves this social
welfare can now be constructed by standard dynamic programming techniques.
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